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Abstract
Retail trade absorbs vast scarce resources because the physical process of trading is time con-
suming, buyers match with sellers without coordination, and consumers prefer to purchase a diverse
basket of goods. Sellers post prices to attract customers, but buyers care also about the expected
time it takes to make a purchase. Retail prices can be non-linear due to packaging and quantity
discounts. However, prices cannot depend on buyers preferences because these are private infor-
mation. To capture these features, we adopt directed search and assume that sellers ignore their
clients preferences. If, realistically, sellers cannot charge a ￿at fee to all potential buyers, then
in equilibrium the average lineup of buyers in front of a seller is ineﬃciently long. In contrast,
the directed search equilibrium is eﬃcient with full information. Our model is easily inserted in a
Neoclassical growth framework. The retail trade sector can be calibrated using commercial margins
and resources employed in that sector.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Commercial margins constitute a very large fraction of the cost of purchasing a typical good. On
average, for every dollar spent before tax in a retail store in the United States, only 57 cents reach
the producers of the merchandise. The remaining 43 cents cover the margins of the merchant
wholesaler (15 cents) and the retailer (28 cents).1 Models with Walrasian markets abstract from
commercial activities. This abstraction would be of little importance if these activities were limited
to transporting commodities from factories to consumers, for then we could think of commerce as a
stage of production with a conventional technology. However, a large fraction of commercial costs
are incurred in the process of contacting and dealing with buyers in bilateral meetings. Moreover,
the size of these costs is independent of the quantities that buyers end up acquiring and cannot
be recovered if the buyer chooses to buy nothing. These facts can only be properly modeled with
non-Walrasian markets. To develop an appropriate framework of analysis, we advance a directed
search model of commerce. This model incorporates the multidimensional competition we observe
in retail trade where buyers and sellers care not only about prices but also about the expected time
it takes to perform a trade.2 Moreover, the model incorporates the fact that sellers cannot directly
observe the buyers￿ willingness to pay.
Even though the purchase of a single item appears to involve minimal costs, the retail trade
sector absorbs vast scarce resources for three main reasons: First, the physical trading process is
time consuming and requires proper facilities, commercial inventories, and other inputs. Second,
buyers do not coordinate their decisions as to when and where to go shopping, so quite often some
buyers are lining up for assistance in front of a seller, while another seller is idle. Third, consumers
are willing to sacri￿c es o m eo ft h e i rt i m et op u r c h a s ead i v e r s eb a s k e to fg o o d s .
To capture these features in a simple model, we consider an environment where buying and
selling are separate activities which require some of the scarce time available in the economy. As
explained below, traders can direct their search to a segment of the market, but inside this segment
1This break-up assumes that the good goes through one merchant wholesaler and one retailer. In our calculations,
we use the gross commercial margins over sales ratios calculated by the Bureau of the Census, Service Sector Statistics
Division for 2000 (0.278 for retail and 0.2054 for wholesale). This data was downloaded in July 1, 2002 from
http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/artstbl.html and http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/atspur.txt.
2The concept of directed search was introduced by Peters (1991) and Montgomery (1991). While these authors
assume a ￿nite number of traders, we ￿nd it convenient to simplify strategic considerations by assuming a large
number of traders as in Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996). The concept is then sometimes referred to as competitive
search. See also Mortensen and Wright (2002).
2buyers and sellers meet randomly in bilateral pairs according to a matching technology as in the
search model of Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990). Finally, due to a technological constraint,
sellers specialize in selling a single good. Therefore, households face a trade-oﬀ between the diversity
of goods they purchase and the time they spend shopping. In equilibrium, they choose to buy many
goods because of their preference for diversity. Although our model provides a natural framework
to address the endogenous creation of stores which sell many goods simultaneously, the holding of
commercial inventories, and the inclusion of ￿xed capital in retail trade, we leave these extensions
for future work.
Competition among retailers is keen. Sellers post and commit to prices to attract customers
to visit their outlets. However, buyers care not only about prices. They also care about the
expected time it takes for them to complete a purchase, or the probability of making a purchase in
a given time interval. Since matching between buyers and sellers is uncoordinated, the probability
of making a purchase in a given time interval depends on the average lineup of buyers in front of
a seller (the ratio of buyers to sellers).
To model the combination of random matching and competition that we observe in retail trade,
we assume that sellers post prices, and buyers direct their search towards the subset of sellers
announcing a particular price oﬀer. We refer to the set of sellers announcing a particular price oﬀer
and the buyers that direct their search towards them as a submarket. The assignment of buyers to
sellers in a submarket is dictated by an exogenous matching technology. As noted by Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999), this framework encompasses many reasonable possibilities. For example, it includes
the possibility that symmetric buyers use identical mixed strategies to select the seller they visit as
in the frictional assignment literature (Peters (1991), Montgomery (1991), Burdett, Shi, and Wright
(2001), and Peters (2000)). Another possibility is that submarkets are located in separate places
(malls or streets) and matching in each submarket takes place according to a matching technology.
As in Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996), we ￿nd that a directed search equilibrium with full
information is eﬃcient. However, we ￿nd that the quali￿cations to this eﬃciency result are more
interesting than the result itself. In retail trade, each seller potentially serves a variety of buyers,
each one with a particular willingness to pay. We refer to this willingness to pay as the buyer￿s type.
With many types purchasing in the same submarket, pricing in a directed search equilibrium with
full information must have one of two unrealistic properties. Either prices must be type dependent,
or they must include a ￿at fee that all potential buyers must pay to cover retail costs.
The type dependent prices necessary to implement the direct search equilibrium with full infor-
3mation requires that preferences be directly observable. This is clearly unrealistic and trivializes the
complexities of retail trade pricing. In our baseline model, we assume that buyers￿ preferences are
private information, so prices cannot depend on them. As we show, this is equivalent to assuming
that in equilibrium bilateral trades between buyers and sellers must be incentive compatible, in the
sense that buyers have no incentive to misrepresent their preferences.3
The second way to implement the directed search equilibrium with full information is by in-
troducing ￿at fees. In retail trade, we observe some instances in which ￿at fees are charged to
buyers prior to their purchasing decision. For example, some warehouse clubs charge membership
fees. However, these fees are the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, even when they are
present, they cover only a small fraction of retail costs. Explaining why ￿at fees are not common
practice is an open question of upmost importance. We do not give a ￿nal answer to this question.
Rather we construct a stylized model of retail trade where ￿at fees cannot arise as an equilibrium
outcome. In our baseline model, buyers learn their valuations as soon as they meet a seller and
observe the good the seller carries. This assumption, combined with the fact buyers￿ valuations can
be arbitrarily low, rules out ￿at fees. Buyers with small valuations will simply refuse to pay the
fee.4 However, our environment does not rule out other forms of non-linear pricing. In fact, the
model predicts that per unit prices should decline with quantity. This may sound counterfactual.
However, retailers use both packaging and explicit quantity discounts to oﬀer these decreasing per
unit prices. For instance, when we purchase a gallon of paint we pay much less than when we
purchase four separate quarters of a gallon of the same paint.
With the informational environment of our baseline model, the directed search equilibrium is
not eﬃcient. In equilibrium the average lineup of buyers in front of a seller is ineﬃciently long.
Nevertheless, a policy maker who faces the same informational constraints as the sellers and whose
only policy instrument is to regulate market prices cannot improve upon the equilibrium allocation
when the production technology is linear (aﬃne production function).5 Thus, if the production
3Admittedly, some transactions in retail trade involve bargaining, and the bargaining process may partially reveal
the willingness to pay of a buyer. Yet, the amount of information revealed in the bargaining process is also limited
by incentive compatibility constraints. Indeed, in the environment we study in this paper there is no exogenous
bargaining rule that attains the eﬃcient outcome when buyers￿ preferences are unobservable. Moreover, bargaining
in retail trade is rare and is inconsistent with ex-ante price posting.
4Using standard terminology in the mechanism design literature, pricing mechanisms which include ￿at fees
violate the individual rationality constraints of the buyers. On the other hand, the type dependent prices necessary
to implement an eﬃcient allocation violate the buyers￿ incentive compatibility constraints.
5In general equilibrium, eﬃciency in the commercial sector is not enough. We also need production eﬃciency.
4technology is linear, the directed search equilibrium is second best eﬃcient.6 Assuming a linear
technology is certainly restrictive. However, as long as the production function is continuously
diﬀerentiable, we can approximate it with an aﬃne production function. Therefore, as long as the
policy maker faces the same informational constraints as the sellers, the welfare gains of regulating
market prices are second order of magnitude. We use numerical simulations to check that these
potential welfare gains are minimal.
Our model can be easily incorporated in a Neoclassical growth framework with two sectors.
One of these sectors produces goods combining capital and labor as is typical in the Neoclassical
framework, while the other exchanges goods in retail markets. The combined model can be es-
timated using standard empirical data. In particular, the parameters of the retail sector can be
identi￿ed and estimated using commercial margins and the average time allocation of households.7
The tractability of the model makes it suitable for further extensions. For example, one can use
this framework to introduce money along the lines of the search theoretical approach of Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989 and 1993). Faig (2001) constitutes a ￿rst attempt in this direction in a simpler
version of the present model. In this simpler version, sellers are restricted to make oﬀers to the
buyers they are paired with which consist of a single quantity-payment pair. Our main improve-
ment with respect to Faig (2001) is the relaxation of this constraint by allowing sellers to make
oﬀers that consist of a price schedule that maps the quantity chosen by a buyer into the payment
to be made to the seller. This price schedule serves as a mechanism to reveal the buyers￿ private
information about their preferences. Also, in Faig (2001) search is undirected and sellers make
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to buyers.
Two recent papers, Soller-Curtis and Wright (2000) and Camera and Delacroix (2001) also study
search-theoretic models where the buyers￿ willingness to pay for a good is private information. In
both of these papers, goods are indivisible and search is undirected. Soller-Curtis and Wright
assume that sellers make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to buyers and they focus on the coexistence of
two prices for the same good in equilibrium. Camera and Delacroix focus on the endogenous
determination of the trade mechanism - sellers can choose if they want to commit to a posted
With a linear technology, the marginal return to labor in the production sector is ￿xed. Thus, the global allocation
of labor is optimal as long as buyers and sellers are given the right incentives in the commercial sector.
6With full information, the restriction to linear technologies is not necessary.
7Shi (1999 and 2001a) also incorporates a search model in a Neoclassical growth framework. The model in Shi
does not diﬀerentiate between producers and sellers as we do. Also, his model assumes full information and random
(undirected) search.
5price or to bargain once they meet a buyer. When buyers have identical preferences and search
is undirected, pre-committing to a price is preferable from the sellers point of view because it
allows them to extract the whole trading surplus. However, when the preferences of the buyers
are heterogeneous, the bargaining process allows the seller to infer information about the buyers￿
preferences and hence to price discriminate. In our paper, goods are divisible, so sellers can commit
to a non-linear price schedule which allows a restricted form of price discrimination even without
bargaining. Also, we incorporate the equilibrium concept of directed search which endogeneizes the
market power of sellers in a reasonable fashion.
Peters and Severinov (1997) also study a model of directed search where the preferences of the
buyers are private information. However, in their model the price setting mechanism is an auction
among the buyers that meet a seller. Moreover, because a single unit is sold in each auction, their
paper does not deal with the price incentives to endogenously determine the size of each purchase.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the model and our equi-
librium concept. Section 3 characterizes the optimal behavior of a representative household for
given prices. Section 4 studies how prices are endogenously determined under directed search by
analyzing the interaction between buyers and sellers in the market place. Section 5 combines the
analyses of the previous two sections into a general equilibrium model where both the behavior of
households and prices in retail trade are endogenous. Section 6 studies the welfare properties of a
directed search equilibrium. Section 7 incorporates a generalized version of our model in a dynamic
Neoclassical growth framework and discusses how to identify the parameters using standard data.
Section 8 brie￿y discusses some of the issues one must confront when extending the present model
and concludes. The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Overview of the Model
The economy consists of a continuum of households with measure one who produce and consume
diﬀerentiated goods. Households do not consume the goods they produce so they need to trade.
Trading activities involve some degree of idiosyncratic uncertainty to be speci￿ed below. To avoid
the ex-post heterogeneity induced by idiosyncratic uncertainty, which severely limits the tractability
of the model, we follow Shi (1997) in assuming that each household is composed of a large number of
individuals. These individuals independently perform the production and exchange activities in the
household. Thanks to the large household assumption, each household faces no uncertainty, even
6though the members of the household who perform trading activities are subject to idiosyncratic
risks. All members of the household equally share the consumption of goods which is their only
source of utility, so there is no con￿ict of interests among them.8
To construct a simple environment where households buy the goods they consume in a retail
trade sector, we make the following assumptions. Each household produces a single divisible good
and likes to consume the goods produced by other households. Because of physical constraints, the
members of the household who perform manufacturing activities (producers) cannot simultaneously
sell the good they produce. Likewise, sellers must remain in their retail outlets to sell their products.
Therefore, for trade to take place the buyers of a household must go around visiting sellers of other
households. Since sellers never meet each other, direct barter is ruled out.
All payments are denominated in an abstract numeraire. In the version of the model analyzed
in this paper, buyers do not need to carry money with them. Instead, all traders have access to a
central clearing-house that records the credits (payments received by sellers) and debits (payments
made by buyers) of all households and ensures that their budget constraint is satis￿ed.
Trading activities are subject to two kinds of uncertainty. First, buyers sometimes ￿nd goods
that, because of idiosyncratic factors, ￿t well the needs of their households while in other occasions
they do not. Second, because of matching frictions, trading meetings between buyers and sellers
are partially random. Thus, a trader may or may not be able to perform a transaction during a
given period.
We model the ￿rst type of uncertainty by assuming a preference shock ε that scales the utility
that a good brings to the household. Preference shocks are realized once a buyer of the household
meets a seller. The realized value of ε is the buyer￿s own private information and cannot be
observed by the seller. Therefore, in a trading meeting the seller ignores the willingness to pay of
the buyer. We believe that this ignorance is key for understanding retail pricing in the same way
that unobservable characteristics of taxpayers are key for understanding income tax schedules.
In order to model both the matching frictions and the price competition that characterize retail
markets, we assume the following form of directed search.9 Prior to the trading period, each
seller j simultaneously posts and commits to a price schedule Zj(q). This schedule speci￿es the
payment required in a transaction as a function of the quantity exchanged.10 In the next stage,
8The absence of a con￿ict of interests between the household and its members is an important diﬀerence between
this paper and Shi (1997).
9Our description of this concept parallels the formulation in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
10Equivalently, because each seller j may meet buyers with diﬀerent private valuations ex post, the seller announces
7buyers observe the menu of price schedules posted by all sellers and simultaneously choose where
to shop. That is, each buyer i decides to trade at a particular price schedule Zi(q) in the set of
posted schedules {Zj(q):for all j}.11 If buyer i meets a seller posting Zi(q) during the trading
period, the buyer privately observes his valuation ε for the seller￿s good, chooses the quantity to be
transacted and pays for it according to the posted price schedule. Buyers can always choose not to
buy anything in which case they pay nothing. If no meeting takes place, then there is no trade.12
We refer to the set of sellers posting Zj(q) and the set of buyers that direct their search to this
price schedule as submarket j.
Depending on buyers￿s search decisions, there may be longer lineups in some submarkets than
in some others. To capture this, we let θj ∈ [0,∞] be the ratio of buyers to sellers in the submarket





where Sj is the measure of sellers posting Zj(q) and Bj is the measure of buyers who decide to trade
at this price schedule. We refer to θj as the congestion in submarket j, o rt h ea v e r a g eq u e u eo fb u y e r s
in front of a seller in this submarket. For the time being and to facilitate the exposition, we assume
that buyers and sellers may perform at most one trade during the trading period (Subsection
5.1 relaxes this assumption). In a submarket with congestion θj, the probability that a seller
meets a buyer is ms(θj),w h e r ems :[ 0 ,∞] → [0,1] is continuously diﬀerentiable, decreasing, and
concave. Symmetrically, a buyer meets a seller with probability mb(θj),w h e r emb :[ 0 ,∞] → [0,1]
is continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and convex. If many buyers seek a few sellers (θj is high),
then it is easy for a seller to ￿nd a buyer and hard for a buyer to ￿nd a seller. By having ms and
mb depend only on θj, we implicitly assume constant returns in matching,13 so
M(Bj,S j)=Bjmb(θj)=Sjms(θj), (2)
a list of quantity-payment pairs {qjv,z jv}v∈V . It is not restrictive to assume that the number of items in this list
is equal to the number of ex post buyer types. A seller￿s strategy is summarized by a price schedule Zj : Qj → <
where Qj = {qjv}v∈V and zjv = Zj(qjv) for all v ∈ V . See Maskin and Riley (1984) which analyzes the problem of a
monopolistic seller who faces no price competition. In their model, however, there are no matching frictions.
11Buyers can also play mixed strategies and randomize over price schedules for which they are indiﬀerent.
12By the revelation principle, the formulation a seller announces a price schedule and buyers with diﬀerent real-
izations of ε self-select along this schedule by choosing their most preferred price quantity combination is equivalent
to a formulation where the seller announces a direct revelation mechanism which induces truthful revelation by the
buyers. See Section 4.
13See Pissarides (1990).
8where M is a standard matching function that maps the measures of buyers and sellers in submarket
j onto the measure of trading meetings in this submarket.
An interesting special case of ms is:
ms(θj)=1− exp(−θj). (3)
This case arises if buyers use identical mixed strategies to select a seller among those who post
equivalent price oﬀers and, because selling is time consuming, each seller can serve at most one
customer (see Peters (2000)). This is the typical setup in the frictional assignment literature.





This special case arises if each buyer is randomly matched with a trader (buyer or seller) in the
submarket where search is directed. (In this case, ms(θj) is equal to the fraction of buyers over
traders in submarket j).
We consider an environment where buyers and sellers are ex-ante symmetric. Given that buyers
a r ef r e et oc h o o s ea m o n gd i ﬀerent price schedules, in a directed search equilibrium, all buyers must
attain the same expected payoﬀ. Furthermore, in equilibrium no seller should have an incentive
to deviate by posting a diﬀerent price schedule. To attract buyers, the oﬀer of the deviating seller
must yield at least the common expected payoﬀ buyers attain in equilibrium.14 Therefore, in a
directed search equilibrium the price schedules and the degree of congestion associated with them
must maximize the expected payoﬀ of sellers subject to the constraint that the buyers get the
common expected payoﬀ. As we show in Section 4, this implies that in our framework there is a
single price schedule and a single submarket in equilibrium.
We proceed to develop our model with the following steps. In Sections 3, 4, and 5, we construct
a static version of the model. In Section 3, we analyze the optimal behavior of a household for a
given price schedule Z(q). Section 4 studies the endogenous determination of the price schedule
Z(q) under directed search. Section 5 collects the results of Sections 3 and 4 in a general equilibrium
model where both the behavior of the household and prices are endogenous.
14Since buyers can play mixed strategies, the expected number of buyers attracted by a single deviator need not
be an integer.
93 A Representative Household
In this section, we describe the behavior of a household whose buyers and sellers trade in a retail
market with a given price schedule Z(q) and a given degree of congestion θ. Because there is a
continuum of households in the economy, the household takes the price schedule and the degree of
congestion as given. We assume Z(q) to be continuously diﬀerentiable and concave with Z(0) = 0.
The next section endogeneizes Z(q) and validates these assumptions. We adopt the following nota-
tion. Lower-case letters denote the decision variables of the household. Upper-case letters denote
the decisions of the other households and hence aggregate quantities, which are also taken as given
by our household. In a symmetric equilibrium, lower-case letters are equal to the corresponding
upper-case letters.
The household is composed of an in￿nite number of individuals. The individuals of the house-
hold are assigned to one of three diﬀerent tasks: production (producers), purchase (buyers), and
sale of commodities (sellers). Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor and can perform
at most one task. The timing of the model is as follows. First, the members of the household are
divided into producers, buyers, and sellers. The measure of individuals assigned to each activity
is denoted by n, b, and s, respectively. Second, all members perform their assigned activities.
Speci￿cally, producers use their labor n to generate output, which immediately becomes available
for sale. Buyers visit sellers from other households. Upon meeting a seller, they experience a ran-
dom shock ε that scales the incremental utility that the good brings to the household. Shocks are
uniformly distributed in [0,1] and are independent across trading meetings. While the distribution
of these shocks in public information, the realized value of ε is the buyer￿s own private information.
Contingent on the realized value of ε, buyers choose the quantity qε they want to acquire from the
seller, and pay zε = Z(qε).15 This payment is immediately debited from the household￿s account
in the clearing-house. Sellers go to retail outlets where they wait for buyers to visit them. When
a seller of the household is visited by a buyer who purchases a quantity Qε, the seller fetches this
quantity from the current household production and collects a payment Zε = Z(Qε),w h i c hi si m -
mediately transferred to the household￿s account in the clearing-house. Finally, once all their tasks
are completed, all the individuals of the household get together and equally share the consumption
of the goods purchased.
The assumption that there is an in￿nite number of members in the household ensures full
15We use ε subscript to denote that q and z are functions of ε.
10diversi￿cation of trading risks. Further, we assume that this number is countable to ensure that
the set of buyers in the household is of measure zero relative to the set of goods for sale by other
households.16 This assumption is technically important because it implies that there are no repeated
purchases of the same good with probability one.17 For convenience, we normalize the measure
of individuals in the household to one, that is we measure sets of individuals in the household as
fractions of the individuals in the set relative to the individuals in the household.
The household￿s utility is U(c), where U : <+ → < is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly










,σ ∈ (0,1). (5)
The term bmb(θ) is the measure of goods located by the b buyers in the household who on average
visit mb(θ) sellers each. The law of large numbers implies that, ex post, the realizations of the
preference shocks for these goods are uniformly distributed in [0,1]. This consumption aggregator
implies that c doubles when qε doubles for all ε,a n dc more than doubles when b doubles. Therefore,
the household has a preference for variety,18 which increases with the parameter σ and vanishes
when σ → 0. The Appendix derives the hedonic measure of consumption in (5) from a standard
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Finally, to avoid dealing with uninteresting corner solutions, we assume
that U is suﬃciently concave, so utility is a concave function of b.
Production y depends on the amount of labor n employed:
y = f(n). (6)
The production function f : <+ → <+ is assumed continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing,
and concave. The sales of the household are equal to the measure of buyers contacted by the
sellers of the household times the average quantity sold by each seller, Q =
R 1
0 Qεdε. Since there
is no aggregate uncertainty in a large household, the amount of output both produced and sold is
identical:
y = sms(θ)Q. (7)
16Remember that there is a continuum of households and thus a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods that each
household can purchase.
17Also, the standard Law of Large Numbers assumes a countable in￿nite number of random variables.
18Note that the household does not buy in￿nitesimal amounts of the goods it purchases because it is costly to send
e x t r ab u y e r st ot h em a r k e t .
11The household must satisfy the budget constraint, that is, total expenditure cannot exceed total
sales revenue:
sms(θ)Z − bmb(θ)z ≥ 0. (8)
Here, Z =
R 1
0 Z (Qε)dε is the average revenue of a seller, and z =
R 1
0 Z (qε)dε is the average
expenditure of a buyer.
The measure of individuals assigned to the three diﬀerent activities in the household must add
up to one:
b + s + n =1 . (9)
The household chooses {qε}ε∈[0,1], b, s, n, c and y to maximize U subject to (5) to (9), and
non-negativity constraints for all variables. Condition (7) can be substituted into (6) to form a
single resource constraint. Also, (5) can be substituted into the objective function U (c).U s i n g
Lagrange multipliers µ, λ, and ϑ for the resource constraint, the budget constraint, and the labor
allocation constraint respectively, the ￿rst-order conditions for an interior maximum are:
U0(c)cσεq−σ














(λZε − µQε)dε = ϑ, and (12)
µf0(n)=ϑ. (13)
Condition (10) states that, conditional on each possible realization ε, buyers must equate the
marginal utility of purchasing an extra unit of a good with the marginal value of the payment
required in return. The other conditions imply that the value of the marginal product of labor in
all three occupations must be the same. This common value is ϑ. Condition (11) equates ϑ to the
expected consumer surplus obtained by a buyer. Condition (12) equates ϑ to the expected surplus
generated by a seller. Finally, condition (13) equates ϑ to the value of the marginal product of
labor of a producer.
4 Commercial Pricing
In this section, we model the interaction between buyers and sellers in the marketplace in a di-
rected search equilibrium when sellers do not know how much buyers are willing to pay for their
merchandise. A bilateral trade is described by a pair (q,z) ∈ <2
+ specifying the quantity q supplied
12by the seller and the payment z given in return by the buyer. In the previous section, the two
elements of this vector were linked by an exogenous price schedule z = Z(q). The purpose of this
section is to endogeneize Z.
The revelation principle allows us to reformulate the problem where sellers post price schedules
and buyers, with diﬀerent realizations of the preference shock, self-select along the schedule of
the sellers they are matched with. Without loss of generality, we may assume that sellers posts
direct revelation mechanisms that induce truth-telling by the buyers (that is, incentive compatible
mechanisms). Feasible mechanisms must also satisfy the individual rationality constraints of the
buyers. Buyers observe the mechanisms posted by the sellers and decide to trade according to a
particular mechanism. In a directed search equilibrium, all posted mechanisms and the degrees of
congestion associated with them must maximize the expected payoﬀ of the seller subject to the
constraint that buyers get a common expected payoﬀ. This result has two direct implications.
First, the mechanisms posted by sellers must be optimal in the set of incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanisms. That is, any posted mechanism must be incentive eﬃcient.
Second, the congestion associated with the mechanism must be such that no other combination of
an incentive eﬃcient mechanism and a congestion level yield the same expected payoﬀ to the buyer
and higher expected payoﬀ to the seller.
4.1 Incentive Eﬃcient Direct Revelation Mechanisms
We begin by characterizing the set of incentive eﬃcient direct revelation mechanisms. That is, we
characterize the direct mechanisms that maximize a weighted sum of the expected payoﬀso ft h e
buyer and the seller subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
We show that the outcome of each incentive eﬃcient direct revelation mechanisms is implemented
when sellers post a price schedule in a particular class, and buyers who choose to trade at these
prices select their most preferred price-quantity combination depending on the realization of the
preference shock.19
In a meeting between a buyer and a seller, the buyer knows the realized value of ε, but the seller
does not. All the seller knows is that ε is a random variable uniformly distributed on the interval
[0,1]. We refer to the realization of ε as the buyer￿s type.
All traders maximize the objectives of the households they belong to. Speci￿cally, the incre-
19One element in this class corresponds with the monopolistic price schedule derived in Maskin and Riley (1984)
and Mussa and Rosen (1978).






ψ ≡ U0(c)cσ, (15)
and λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (8). The incremental utility of a seller￿s sale is
the gross commercial margin:
Us (q,z)=λz − µq, (16)
where µ is the multiplier associated with (7).20 By symmetry, the variables ψ, λ, and µ are identical
across households. Because each buyer and each seller are in￿nitesimal in the household they belong
to, the values of ψ, λ, and µ are not aﬀected by their individual actions. For ease of exposition, we
shall refer to Ub and Us as the utility functions of buyers and sellers respectively.
A direct revelation mechanism is a schedule of type-contingent trades {qε,z ε}ε∈[0,1]. Ad i r e c t
revelation mechanism is incentive eﬃcient if it maximizes a weighted sum of the expected utilities
of buyers and sellers:











where ω ∈ [0,1], subject to the following constraints:
1. Incentive Compatibility: Buyers must have no incentive to lie about their type:





, for all ε0 ∈ [0,1]. (18)
2. Individual Rationality: Buyers and sellers must receive non-negative utility in all meetings:21
Ub (qε,z ε;ε) ≥ 0, for all ε ∈ [0,1], and (19)
Us (qε,z ε) ≥ 0, for all ε ∈ [0,1]. (20)
In the appendix, we use standard arguments in the mechanism design literature to characterize




s are de￿ned so that they are aligned with the household￿s ￿rst order conditions (11) and (12).
21This property follows from the combination of two facts: the buyer observes the variety oﬀered by the seller as
soon as they meet, and both buyers and sellers have the option of not trading. If sellers could hide their variety for
sale, then they could demand a payment from the buyers to reveal this information. In this case, buyers could end
up with negative utility in some meetings.
14Proposition 1 The incentive eﬃcient direct revelation mechanisms which solve program (17) sub-






























0 for ω ∈ [0,0.5)
2ω−1
3ω−1 for ω ∈ [0.5,1]
(23)
The following proposition establishes that the outcome of an incentive eﬃcient direct revela-
tion mechanism can be implemented if sellers post a simple non-linear price schedule and buyers
optimally choose the quantity they want to acquire at these prices.
Proposition 2 The outcome of an incentive eﬃcient direct revelation mechanism can be attained











where γ ∈ [0,0.5] satis￿es (23). We refer to a price schedule with parameter γ a st h ep r i c es c h e d u l e
γ.
As long as commercial margins are positive (γ>0), the pricing schedule Z(q) is strictly concave.
This concavity implies that the per unit price of goods declines with q, or equivalently buyers obtain
quantity discounts. This is not unrealistic. In retail trade, sometimes we observe explicit quantity
discounts, but most often quantity discounts are implicit in the packaging of products (the larger
is the box of nails, the lower is the per unit price).
When buyers have full market power, that is when ω =0 , prices cover only the marginal cost
of production (γ =0 ) . In this case, buyers capture the whole trading surplus and the individual
rationality constraint of the seller binds. This constraint continues to bind as long as ω ≤ 0.5.F o r
ω>0.5, commercial margins are positive and both the buyer and the seller appropriate a fraction
of the trading surplus. Even when sellers have full market power, that is when ω =1and γ =0 .5,
they are not able to extract the whole trading surplus because they do not know their clients￿
15type. The latter case is an interesting benchmark, which we denote monopolistic search. With
monopolistic search, sellers post the prices that maximize their expected pro￿ts in an environment
where their price schedules have no eﬀect on the number of clients visiting their outlets. This might
be the relevant equilibrium concept for some tourist areas where buyers have little knowledge about
where to shop. However, in most commercial areas sellers are aware that by posting low prices
they can attract clients to their outlets. To capture these competitive pressures on prices, we adopt
directed search as our concept of equilibrium.
4.2 Trade-oﬀ between prices and congestion
Let Vb(θj,γj) and Vs(θj,γj) respectively be the expected utility of buyers and sellers in a submarket














(λzε − µqε)dε (26)














σ γj(1 − γj). (28)
In a directed search equilibrium, Vb must be common to all active submarkets, because buyers
are free to choose the submarket where they direct their search. Also, the pair (θj,γj) must
maximize Vs(θj,γj) subject to the constraint that Vb(θj,γj) is equal to the common expected
utility attained by buyers in all active submarkets. The solution to this maximization problem, if
one exists, is unique.22 Hence, there is a unique submarket in a directed search equilibrium, and the
subscript j can be omitted. As long as sellers capture a fraction of the expected trading surplus,23











22Substituting the constraint in the objective function and dropping unnecessary constants, θj must maximize the











,w h e r ev is a constant inversely proportional to
the given value for V
b.
23In our model, a zero expected payoﬀ for sellers cannot be an equilibrium because there would be no sellers. See
next section.
16That is, buyers and sellers must have a common marginal rate of substitution of θ for γ.D i ﬀeren-










Equation (30) provides a simple restriction that pricing schedules and congestion levels must satisfy
in a directed search equilibrium. In the next section, we pinpoint the equilibrium pair (θ,γ) by
combining this restriction with the optimal choice of the measure of buyers and sellers in each
household.
5 General Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize a directed search equilibrium by combining the optimal behavior of
households in Section 2 with the endogenous determination of the pricing function in Section 3.
De￿nition: The tuple {θ,n,b,s,c,y,qε,z ε,ψ,µ,λ,Z(q)} is a symmetric directed search equilibrium
if
1. All households choose {n,b,s,c,y,qε} taking as given the payment schedule Z(q)
and the market congestion ratio θ, and the implied payments are zε = Z (qε).
2. The payment schedule Z(q) satis￿es (24) when ψ satis￿es (15) and µ and λ are the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the resource constraint and the budget constraint
in the household￿s optimization program.
3. The pair (γ,θ) satis￿es condition (30).
4. Congestion ratios are consistent with individual behavior: θ = b/s.
Since in a symmetric search equilibrium all households behave identically, lower-case and upper-case
letters coincide.
In equilibrium, a household must obtain the same utility from allocating an individual to any
of the three activities, as it is implied by the ￿rst-order conditions (11) to (13). Therefore, Vb(θ,γ)





17According to (32), the congestion of buyers in the market θ is inversely related to γ.A sγ increases
buyers capture a smaller fraction of the trade surplus (see Proposition 2), so households respond
by sending fewer buyers and more sellers to the marketplace. Combining (32) with (30), we obtain





Consequently, the eﬃciency condition (29) together with the equality of expected payoﬀs of buyers
and sellers determine the two key variables in the retail sector: congestion θ and price schedule γ.
To determine the remaining variables in the model, we must combine the resource constraints,
the household￿s ￿rst order conditions, and the de￿nitions of θ, c, and ψ.E q u a t i n gVb(θ,γ) to the









γ (1 − γ). (34)
Integrating the quantities traded when buyers face a price schedule γ w h i c ha r eg i v e nb y( 2 1 ) ,w e









(1 − γ). (35)





















Equation (38) determines n for a given value of γ. In a directed search equilibrium, γ and θ are
obtained from (30) and (33). Given θ, γ,a n dn, the equilibrium values for s, b, ψ/µ, qε,c ,y ,ψ ,
and µ are recursively determined by (36), (1), (34), (21), (5), (6), (15), and (34). The utility value
of the payment schedule λZ (q) is determined by (24), but the precise values of λ and Z (q) are
indeterminate because they depend on the units in which payments are measured.
The following proposition summarizes the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a
directed search equilibrium (the proof is in the Appendix):
18Proposition 3 If the elasticity η(θ) is non-increasing and belongs to the interval (0,1),24 and
the following terminal conditions are satis￿ed: f (0) = 0 and f0(0) > 0, then a directed search
equilibrium exists and is unique.25
To calculate the average commercial margin in a directed search equilibrium, we use (21) to





ε dε =( 1+γσ)µq. (39)








= λz − µq. (40)






[1 − η(θ)]. (41)
The commercial margin increases with both the preference for diversity σ and the contribution of
sellers in the matching process measured by 1 − η(θ).26
5.1 Multiple Matches
In our model, there is no logical reason to restrict buyers and sellers to at most one match each
period. The extension to multiple matches is straightforward for the following reasons. Individual
traders (buyers or sellers) are in￿nitesimal in the household where they belong, so their individual
actions have no eﬀect on the shadow valuations of goods, labor, and payments in the household:
ψ, µ, and λ. Moreover, thanks to the clearing-payments mechanism, an individual buyer is not
restricted by the money he or she carries. Likewise, thanks to the immediate access to current
production, an individual seller is not restricted by available commercial inventories. Therefore,
the optimal strategies of buyers and sellers in successive trading meetings do not depend on their
24The two examples (3) and (4) satisfy these conditions.
25This proof also uses the continuity and concavity of m
s and f, and the continuity and convexity of m
b assumed
throughout the paper.
26With full information, 1 − η (θ) is the fraction of the trade surplus appropriated by sellers in a directed search
equilibrium. This division of the surplus endogeneizes the matching externalities, so the equilibrium allocation is
eﬃcient. See Hosios (1990).
19individual histories. Our analysis andr e s u l t sa p p l yw i t ha l m o s tn om o d i ￿cation to a generalized
model where buyers and sellers can perform multiple matches each period. In that model, we
reinterpret ms(θ) and mb (θ) as the expected number of trading matches that a seller and a buyer
perform during a period respectively. With this reinterpretation, the image of these two functions
is [0,∞) instead of [0,1].27 Conveniently, this allows for a Cobb-Douglas matching technology for
which the elasticity of ms (θ) is a constant.
6W e l f a r e
This section studies the welfare properties of the directed search equilibrium. To this end, it
characterizes the optimal allocation that a benevolent central planner would choose in order to
maximize the utility of a representative household. Following standard practice, the central planner
is not only bound by the resources available in the economy, but also by the bilateral matching
among traders. In addition, it is sensible that we restrict the central planner to information that
is publicly available. However, imposing this restriction is much more subtle than it ￿rst appears.
The incentive compatibility constraint (18) arising from the fact that the buyers￿ types are private
information is only binding when selling costs must be ￿nanced with the revenue from sales (see
below). Moreover, the central planner can easily aﬀect this revenue with policy tools that, in
principle, are respectful to private information, for example, a sales tax or a sales subsidy. Due to
the subtleties of restricting the central planner to public information, we start by characterizing
the ￿rst best allocation, in which the central planner is not bound by the incentive compatibility
constraints imposed by private information. This allocation is an interesting benchmark in itself
and is useful to evaluate the welfare costs of private information. Later, we introduce private
information with speci￿c assumptions about the policy tools at the disposal of the central planner.
6.1 The Optimum with Complete Information
The ￿rst best allocation is one in which the central planner maximizes the utility of a representative
household subject to the resources available in the economy and the bilateral matching among
traders. Let M(b,s) be the aggregate matching function, that is M(b,s)=bmb(b/s)=sms(b/s).
27With multiple matches, it is important that buyers can play mixed strategies when they choose which prices
to search. Otherwise, a deviating seller would have a hard time attracting prospective buyers because these would
dislike being in a submarket where there is a single good.
20The planner must solve the following program:
max
b,s,n,qε














qεdε = f (n). (43)
The ￿rst-order conditions of this problem are:
εψq−σ




















qεdε = µf0(n), (46)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier of (43) and ψ = U0(c)cσ.I nt h e￿rst best, the marginal utility
of consuming each good must be equal to the marginal production cost. Also, the marginal social
bene￿t of employment in all three activities must be the same. Comparing (45) and (46), we obtain
Mb(b,s)=Ms(b,s). (47)
Equality (47) implies that for a given number of traders the number of trading meetings is max-
imized. Equations (9) and (43) to (46) can be easily manipulated to obtain an almost explicit
solution of the ￿rst best allocation (see the Appendix for details):
Proposition 4 The ￿rst best allocation, in which the central planner has both complete information























The following proposition compares the allocations in the ￿rst best and in the directed search
equilibrium. To facilitate this comparison, it specializes the production and matching technologies
to standard functional forms:
21Proposition 5 Suppose all the assumptions used in Proposition 3 to ensure existence and unique-
ness of an equilibrium hold. Let an asterisk denote ￿rst best and no asterisk denote directed search












n∗, with equality if η(θ) is constant. (55)
Finally, if f is constant returns to scale,
q<q∗. (56)
In a directed search equilibrium, selling costs are ￿nanced with commercial margins that create
a wedge between the marginal production cost of merchandises and the price paid by buyers. This
wedge reduces the quantities that buyers purchase in each transaction for given valuations of goods
and labor ψ and µ (compare (21) and (44)). However, ex-ante price competition among sellers
narrows commercial margins so the congestion of buyers to sellers in equilibrium is higher than
in the ￿rst best. Intuitively, the equilibrium price schedule must play two con￿icting allocational
roles: It must signal buyers the opportunity cost of the goods they are considering to purchase,
and it must ￿nance retail costs in order to induce an eﬃcient ratio of sellers over buyers. The
equilibrium price schedule settles on a compromise between these two roles. Prices are higher than
the social opportunity cost of goods but not high enough to ￿nance the ￿r s tb e s tr a t i oo fs e l l e r s
over buyers. Even though, commercial margins induce buyers to purchase smaller quantities, the
comparison between qε and q∗
ε is ambiguous because the equilibrium and the ￿r s tb e s ta s s i g na
diﬀerent shadow value to the cost of production relative to the utility of consumption (µ/ψ).I n
the special case where f is constant returns to scale, we can prove that on average buyers purchase
an ineﬃciently low quantity when they meet a seller.
I nt h eb a s e l i n ec a s ew h e r eb o t hf and ms are isoelastic, the ratio (s/n) is identical in the
equilibrium and the ￿rst best allocations. Therefore, in this baseline case the ineﬃciently high
(b/s) ratio implies that in equilibrium the measure of buyers is ineﬃciently high and the measures
of sellers and producers are ineﬃciently low. In general, the equilibrium allocation of labor relative
to the ￿rst best depends on whether the elasticities f and ms are increasing or decreasing with
respect to n and θ respectively.
22As in Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996), the ￿rst best allocation can be implemented as a directed
search equilibrium when buyers and sellers have complete information. In this case, a bilateral trade
must maximize the joint surplus of buyers and sellers. Moreover, the ex-ante price competition
among sellers leads to sharing this surplus according to Hosios￿s (1990) rule, that is buyers get
af r a c t i o nη(θ) of the surplus and sellers get 1 − η(θ),a n dθ is the ￿rst best level of congestion.
With private information about buyers￿ types, this equilibrium breaks down because the incentive
compatibility constraint (18) is violated.
The ￿rst best allocation can be decentralized as a directed search equilibrium where buyers￿
types are private information if sellers can charge a ￿at fee to prospective buyers prior to the
realization of the preference shock ε. In this case, the fee covers selling costs without having to add
a positive commercial margin on the price of merchandises. In our model, such a fee is prevented
by the assumption that buyers get the preference shock as soon as they meet a seller, so a buyer
is not willing to pay the fee if the realization of ε is low. That is, ￿at fees violate the individual
rationality constraint of buyers. More generally, one could realistically assume that the buyers￿
satisfaction from a commercial transaction depends on the service eﬀo r tp r o v i d e db yt h es e l l e r .I n
this more complicated model, the ￿at unconditional fee is also discouraged by the moral hazard
problem it generates on the eﬀort exercised by sellers. In reality, we ￿nd ￿at fees in warehouse
clubs. However, sales in warehouse clubs are a small fraction of the economy-wide retail sales, and
even these clubs charge fees that cover a small fraction of their commercial costs.
The following proposition summarizes these two ways of decentralizing the ￿r s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n :
Proposition 6 The ￿rst best allocation where the planner has complete information can be imple-
mented as a directed search equilibrium if buyers and sellers have complete information or if sellers
can charge a lump-sum fee to prospective buyers prior to the realization of the preference shock ε.
6.2 The Optimum with Private Information
This subsection characterizes second best allocations when the central planner has limited infor-
mation. Given that buyers￿ types are private information it is natural to assume that the central
planner cannot directly observe them. However, if the central planner can monitor the allocation
o fl a b o ri ne a c hh o u s e h o l d ,t h e nt h e￿rst best allocation can be easily implemented by dictating
to households the allocation of labor, charging buyers the marginal cost of producing merchandise,
and transferring the proceeds of these payments to sellers. With this mechanism, buyers truthfully
23reveal their types without any eﬃciency loss. To make our analysis more realistic and more in-
teresting than this simple result, we assume that the central planner cannot directly observe how
households allocate their labor. This assumption is in line with the unobservability of leisure (and
so the allocation of time when there are two activities) in the standard theory of taxation.
Speci￿cally, we assume that the planner can only observe market transactions and only has
control of the direct revelation mechanisms by which transactions are conducted, or equivalently
the price schedules faced by buyers and sellers. Given these price schedules, buyers choose the
quantities they want to purchase, which sellers supply as long as prices are above the marginal
costs of production. Households decide the allocation of labor taking into account the expected
returns from each activity.
In principle, buyers and sellers could face diﬀerent price schedules. If so, the gap between the
two schedules is a sales tax (or a sales subsidy) to be collected (or distributed) by a government
who balances its budget with a lump-sum subsidy (or a lump-sum tax) on households. In the two
propositions that follow, we make alternative assumptions on the central planner￿s ability to control
the pricing mechanism and to impose lump-sum taxes on households.
In the absence of any restriction on these policy instruments, the central planner can implement
the ￿rst best allocation despite the presence of private information:
Proposition 7 If the central planner can resort to lump-sum taxes on households to ￿nance a
linear sales subsidy, then the ￿rst best allocation characterized in Proposition 4 can be decentralized










where θ is the solution to (48). (The price schedule faced by sellers is TZ(q)).
This proposition implies that the planner could not do better by introducing additional control
instruments. Intuitively, the proposition holds because the planner picks the tab for the selling
costs with the sales subsidy. Hence, the prices faced by the buyers can be equated to the marginal
social cost of production of merchandises.
24The implementation of the ￿rst best allocation in Proposition 7 depends on the existence of
lump-sum taxes. In the model, this is not problematic because all households are identical. How-
ever, this homogeneity is unrealistic and has been assumed only for simplicity. The next proposition
assumes the absence of lump-sum taxes.
Proposition 8 If the only policy instrument is to set the retail trade price schedule and the mar-
ginal product of labor is constant (the production function is aﬃne), a directed search equilibrium
is optimal.
If the production function is aﬃne,28 a central planner without recourse to lump-sum taxes
cannot improve upon the directed search equilibrium. When the production function is not aﬃne,
regulation of the price schedule can be welfare enhancing because it has an indirect eﬀect on the
marginal product of labor which diﬀers from its ￿rst best value. However, as long as the production
function is diﬀerentiable, it can always be approximated with an aﬃne production function, and so
the welfare gains of deviating from the directed search equilibrium are second order of magnitude.
In the next section, we use numerical simulations to check that these gains are very small.
7 Commerce in a Neoclassical Growth Framework
This section sketches how to embed the model developed in the previous sections in a Neoclassical
growth framework. In the extended model, time is in￿nite and discrete. Each period in the life of
a household proceeds as in the static model. Also, in the resulting synthesis, the economy has two
sectors: one produces goods combining capital and labor as in the Neoclassical growth model, the
other exchanges goods in directed search markets where buyers￿ types are private information.29
To make our model as close as possible to the basic Neoclassical growth model, we assume that
investment does not require installation or commercial costs. However, future work could incorpo-
rate these features. For brevity, we omit all proofs, which are either standard in the Neoclassical
growth theory or parallel the arguments in the previous sections.
The household￿s intertemporal utility function is
28Since labor is the only production input, this assumption is satis￿ed with constant returns to scale. In the next
section, we add capital to the production technology. In that case, the restriction to aﬃne production functions is
not implied by constant returns.
29In the absence of capital, all periods are identical, so the equilibrium allocation is time invariant and identical to




where β ∈ (0,1) is the household￿s discount factor.
Also, the production of goods requires not only labor but also capital:
yt = F(kt,n t). (60)
The production function F : <2
+ → <+ maps capital and labor into output. This function is
continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing in both arguments, concave, and homogeneous of degree
one. Also, the Inada conditions for an interior solution are assumed to apply.
Goods can be used for both consumption and investment. When goods are used for consump-
tion, they are exchanged in the same type of markets as those described in the previous sections.
G o o d su s e df o rc o n s u m p t i o na r ep e r i s h a b l ea n dm u s tb es o l di nt h es a m ep e r i o di nw h i c ht h e y
are produced. When goods are used for investment, they are perfect substitutes for one another.
To save commercial costs, households use part of their own output to increase their capital stock.
Therefore, households allocate a fraction of their output to be sold and another fraction to invest-
ment:
yt = kt+1 − kt (1 − δ)+stms(θt)qt, (61)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate. The fraction destined for sale is consumed by the pur-
chasing households.
Each period t the household is subject to constraints (5), (7) to (9), (60) and (61).30 The problem
of the household is to choose {qεt}ε∈[0,1], bt, st,n t,c t,y t and kt+1 to maximize (59) subject to this
system of constraints. We use Lagrange multipliers βtµt,β tλt, and βtϑt for the resource constraint,
the budget constraint, and the labor allocation constraint respectively. Then, the optimal behavior
of a household is characterized by the same ￿rst-order conditions as those in Section 2, that is (10) to
(13), with all variables indexed by the corresponding time subscript, and the obvious modi￿cation
that output and the marginal product of labor now depend on the capital stock. Moreover, the
30Regarding condition (8), we could allow the clearing-house to pay or charge interest on the balance of credits and
debits imposing only an intertemporal budget constraint on the households. However, since all households behave
identically, all balances must be zero in equilibrium. Therefore, we can simplify the exposition by assuming that the
balance of credits and debits for each household must be zero in each period.
26following two conditions must hold:
µt = µt+1 [Fk(kt+1,n t+1)+1− δ]β, and (62)
lim
t→∞
β−tµtkt =0 . (63)
Equation (62) states that the value of one unit of output today is equal to the present discounted
value of the gross marginal product of capital, while equation (63) is a standard transversality
condition.
A directed search equilibrium is a set {θt,n t,b t,s t,c t,y t,k t+1,q εt,z εt,ψt,µ t,λ t,Zt(q)}∞
t=0 sat-
isfying conditions analogous to the ones in the de￿nition in Section 5. This equilibrium is now
d e s c r i b e db yas y s t e mo fd i ﬀerence equations for the variables kt and µt: (61) and (62) together
with the time-indexed versions of conditions (1), (9), (15), (21), (30), (32), (34),31 ( 3 5 ) ,( 3 7 ) ,a n d
(60). This system together with the initial condition k0 and the terminal condition (63) determines
the equilibrium path. For all capital stocks, equations (30) and (32) still determine the pricing
parameter γt and the congestion θt of buyers over sellers in the market for consumption goods.
Therefore, these two variables are constant along an equilibrium path.
Qualitatively, the dynamics of capital accumulation are identical to those of the Neoclassical
growth model. Capital converges monotonically to a steady state where kt and µt are constant.
For low capital stocks, both the marginal product of capital and the utility price of capital µt are
high relative to the steady state. High levels of µt induce low consumption and high supply of
labor into production, and as a result high saving. As capital is accumulated, households not only
increase the fraction of output allocated for consumption, but also the fraction of labor allocated
to the exchange of commodities.
In the steady state, equation (62) implies that the net marginal product of capital is equal to

































31Taking into account that the marginal product of labor depends on both capital and labor.
27Equations (64) and (65) determine the steady state capital stock and labor allocated into pro-
duction. The steady state values of the remaining variables (b, s, qε, and µ) are obtained from
equations analogous to those in Section 4.
As in the version of the model without capital, a central planner who faces the same informa-
tional constraints as the market and who only has control of the direct revelation mechanism by
which transactions are conducted cannot improve upon the allocation in a directed search equi-
librium when the production technology is linear. With the existence of capital, constant returns
to scale does not imply that the production technology is linear. However, with constant returns
to scale the diﬀerence in welfare between a directed search equilibrium and the allocation that is
attained when the central planner chooses the direct revelation trading mechanism are negligible
for reasonable parameters (see the numerical example in the following subsection).
As in the Neoclassical growth model, output and capital converge to a steady growth path if
the utility function U is isoelastic and the eﬃciency of labor in the production of goods grows at a
constant rate. Also, the utility function can be easily extended to include leisure or home services.
In this case, the restrictions on U for convergence to a steady growth path are the standard ones.
7.1 Numerical Calibration
In the context of the Neoclassical growth framework, our model of commerce can be estimated
using standard economic data. In this subsection, we discuss how to identify the parameters of
the model, and we provide a numerical calibration of the model. For this purpose, we assume





t and F(kt,e tnt)=A1kα
t (etnt)
1−α.32 We also assume that the eﬃciency of
labor in the production of goods (et) grows at a constant rate g.
As is standard in the Neoclassical growth model, the parameters α, β, δ, and g can be estimated
using capital and labor income shares in the sector producing goods, the real return on capital, the
durability of capital, and the average growth rate of output. In our numerical example in Table
2, we pick standard estimates for these parameters. The two remaining parameters of the model
to estimate are the preference for diversity (σ) and the elasticity of matches with respect to the
number of sellers (η).33 These two parameters can be identi￿ed with empirical estimates of the
32When preferences are logarithmic, the system of diﬀerence equations characterizing a directed search equilibrium
is greatly simpli￿ed because then stm




33The values of the technological constants A0 and A1 are irrelevant for the calculations in Table 1, and aﬀect
only the units in which we measure output and hedonic consumption.
28average commercial margin and the congestion in the retail sector. In a directed search equilibrium,



















Therefore, with estimates of the average commercial margin and market congestion we can solve
for σ and η.
The Bureau of the Census of the United States reports that the average commercial margin for
retail trade has quite stable around 0.28 during the last decade.34 The Bureau of Labor Statistics
measures the number of production employees in retail trade and the average weekly hours that
these employees work. The product of these two measures is the empirical counterpart of st (465
million hours/week in 1986).35 To calculate bt, we multiply the average time spent shopping by
an adult (3.4 hours/week in 1986) reported in Robinson, Andreyenkov, and Patrushev (1989, p.
84)36 by the number of shoppers in the economy (United States population 16 and over). This
product measures the empirical counterpart of bt (630 million hours/week in 1986). This implies
that congestion is 1.35 (’ 630/465). Applying these estimates to the system (66) and (67), we
obtain η =0 .46 and σ =0 .42.
Using the estimated parameters, Table 1 compares the directed search equilibrium and the
￿r s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n . 37 In equilibrium, households spend less time producing and selling goods and
more time shopping than in the ￿rst best. Also, in equilibrium buyers leave empty handed from
27 percent of the trading meetings while they always acquire a positive amount of goods in the
￿rst best. Welfare in the two allocations is quite diﬀerent. Changing from the ￿rst best balanced
34See http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/artstbl.html. The commercial margin varies widely by the type of busi-
ness of the retailers. For example, in 2000, at the lower end, we ￿nd the commercial margins for Warehouse Clubs
and Superstores (0.167), Automotive Dealers (0.175), and Gasoline Stations (0.208). At the upper end, we have the
margins for Specialty Food Stores (0.419), Clothing and Footwear (0.426), and Furniture (0.441). In this paper we
abstract from the reasons why diﬀerent goods may trade with diﬀerent margins, although this is an interesting topic
for future research.
35We use 1986 to estimate congestion because the survey on the time individuals spend shopping that we have
on hand refers to that year. The data was downloaded in July 1, 2002 from http://stats.bls.gov/data/home.htm
(production employees in retail trade: 15.924 million, average hours worked by production employees: 29.2).
36This is the most recent estimate of average time allocated to shopping that we could ￿nd. We do not expect that
indices of congestion vary dramatically over time.
37The balance growth paths are calculated using the formulas described in the previous sections. The transitional
dynamics necessary to calculate the last row are obtained using standard numerical methods.
29path to the equilibrium balanced path is equivalent to a 7.94 percent drop in consumption. When
the transitional costs of changing the capital stock are taken into account this percentage drops
slightly to 7.87.38 This large welfare cost is not easy to avoid with correcting policies. For example,
regulating the price schedule in a directed search equilibrium leads only to a negligible welfare
improvement equivalent to less than a 10−5 percent increase in consumption. (This improvement
would be zero if the production technology were linear instead of Cobb-Douglas). The large dif-
ference in welfare between a directed search equilibrium and the ￿r s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o ni sd u et ot h e
necessity of ￿nancing retail costs with large commercial mark-ups. This ineﬃciency is unavoidable
in the absence of some form of lump-sum taxes which would allow to subsidize retail trade.
8 Conclusion and Extensions
Search models have been used to study decentralized markets where traders meet bilaterally. These
models have been useful to analyse the labor market. Also, with the work of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989 and 1993) they have become the dominant paradigm for the theoretical microfoundations of
money. Our paper uses search to capture some important features of the retail sector.
Our key assumption is that matching buyers with the sellers that carry their desired products is
costly. We model this cost with the search technology of Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990).
We also assume that buyers are aware of the price schedules of sellers and as a result they direct
their search to a subset of sellers with the most desirable combination of prices and congestion.
To formalize this idea we incorporate the concept of directed search equilibrium in Peters (1991).
Finally, we assume that the buyers￿ willingness to pay for a particular product is not observable.
In this way, we extend directed search to a framework with private information.
In this framework, we study the welfare properties of a directed search allocation by comparing it
to the allocation chosen by a central planner. If the planner faces the same informational constraints
as the market and only has control of the direct revelation mechanism by which transactions are
conducted, then a directed search equilibrium coincides with the choice of the planner when the
production technology is linear. However, if the planner can use lump-sum taxes to subsidize sales,
the planner can improve upon the equilibrium outcome. In fact, the planner can achieve the ￿rst
best allocation by introducing a linear subsidy on sales. The ￿rst best also coincides with a directed
search equilibrium if sellers can charge a ￿at fee to all buyers that seek to trade with them.
38In this comparison, we assume that both the equilibrium path and the ￿rst best path start with the same capital
stock (the one in the ￿rst best).
30Even if large commercial margins are unavoidable in the absence of lump-sum taxation, their
existence is important for policy design. For example, large commercial margins have a profound
eﬀect on the welfare cost of sales taxes, because a zero tax rate on sales is already a large departure
from the ￿rst best, so the standard result that small taxes cause negligible dead-weight-losses does
not apply. Moreover, because of standard tax equivalence results, the welfare costs of income taxes
must also be much larger when commercial margins are taken into account.
For simplicity, we have abstracted from the existence of money by assuming that payments can
be made through a central clearing-house. In the absence of this centralized system of payments,
money is a useful device that facilitates trade as in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989 and 1993). Faig
(2001) introduces money in a simpler version of the present model where sellers are constrained
by the set-up to make oﬀers that consist of a single quantity-payment pair (q, z). The main com-
plication of introducing money in the present set-up is that in equilibrium when buyers are lucky
to ￿nd a good for which they have a high valuation they would like to spend more money than
they carry. Because this is not possible, they are liquidity constrained. Moreover, these liquidity
constraints aﬀect equilibrium price schedules. Despite this complication, the model remains an-
alytically tractable, but the algebraic expressions are longer and harder to interpret than in the
present contribution. For this reason, we plan to study the monetary version of the present model
in a separate paper.
31APPENDIX
Derivation of (5)
Let qj be the quantity purchased and εj be the preference shock in each match j between a buyer
















Here, J and J0 denote the number of matches and the number of household members respectively.
The goods acquired have diﬀerent valuations for the household. For a given quantity purchased
qj, the household gets maximum utility when the realization of the shock in a match is εj =1 ,
and this utility declines linearly to 0 as εj decreases to 0. Because there is a countable number of
potential purchases and a continuum of goods, with probability one an additional purchase brings
a new good to the set of goods consumed by the household.
Since the number of household members is large, the measure of matches between the buyers
















Moreover, the stochastic variables εj are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and are inde-
pendent across meetings. Let qε denote the quantity purchased by a buyer when the realization of
t h ep r e f e r e n c es h o c ki sε. The Law of Large Numbers implies the formula in (5).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Let the indirect utility of a type-ε buyer be de￿ned as
vε ≡ Ub (qε,z ε;ε). (70)
Using vε, the incentive compatibility constraint (18) can be restated with the help of the following
standard result (see Mas-Colell, Winston and Green, 1995, Proposition 23.D.2):
Lemma A direct revelation mechanism satis￿es the incentive compatibility constraint (18) if and












dx, for all ε ∈ [0,1]. (71)
32Using this lemma and constraints (19) and (20) together with the de￿nitions (14), (16), and





















qε ≥ 0, (74)





− vε − µqε ≥ 0, (76)
qε is non-decreasing, (77)
q0 =0 , and v0 =0 . (78)






− vε = πε + µqε (79)
This program can be solved with a standard application of the Pontryagin￿s Maximum Principle.
We organize the solution to the program in three steps:
(a) Constraints (73) to (78) imply that there is a γ ∈ [0,1) such that the solution {qε,v ε}ε∈[0,1] to
program (72) obeys: qε =0 and vε =0for ε ∈ [0,γ],a n dqε > 0 and vε > 0 for ε>γ .
Constraints (77) and (78) immediately imply that there is γ ∈ [0,1] such that qε =0for
ε ∈ [0,γ],a n dqε > 0 for ε>γ .W h e nqε =0 , constraints (75) and (76) imply that vε =0 . With
these results, constraint (73) implies that qε > 0 if and only if vε > 0. Finally, if γ were 1, the
optimized value of (72) would be zero, which cannot be a solution to the maximization program
because there are many feasible direct revelation mechanisms that achieve a positive value. For





σ and vε = 1
2
σ






39 œ vε denotes the derivative of v with respect to ε evaluated at ε.
40This is the optimal direct mechanism for ω =1 .


































Let ζε denote the co-state variable associated with the diﬀerential equation (73). The current-
value Hamiltonian of the program is:



















ε =0 . (84)
The co-state variable must obey
‡
œ ζε = −Hvε
·
:
œ ζε = −(1 − 2ω). (85)
Finally, the transversality implies41
ζ1 =0 . (86)
The value of the co-state variable ζε can be solved for explicitly using conditions (85) and (86):
ζε =( 2 ω − 1)(ε − 1). (87)














(1 − γ)µqε. (89)
41The transversality condition is ζ1v1 =0 . However, v1 > 0 because of step (a).










So far, we have disregarded constraints (74) to (78). However, for ε ≥ γ,t h ev a l u e so fqε,v ε,
and πε in (88), (89), and (90) are well de￿ned and satisfy these constraints. Moreover, at ε = γ,
qε = vε =0 . Hence, (a) implies qε = vε = πε =0for ε ≤ γ. The Hamiltonian is strictly concave
with respect to qε, and when the Hamiltonian is evaluated at the optimal choice of qε it is concave
with respect to vε. Therefore, (80) to (82) characterize the unique maximum of the program. ⁄













When ω =0 .5, the variable vε cancels in the objective (72) so the problem becomes separable
across types. Ignoring constraints (76) and (77), the ￿rst-order conditions of the problem yield
(91). Integrating (73) from 0 to ε and noting v0 =0 , we obtain (92). Using the de￿nition in (76),
we obtain πε =0for all ε ∈ [0,1].T h ev a l u e so fqε and vε in (91) and (92) satify constraints (76)
and (77), so they solve program (72) subject to (73) to (78). Furthermore, the solution for ω =0 .5
maximizes the expected payoﬀ of the buyer subject to a zero expected payoﬀ for the seller. A
fortiori, given constraint (76), the same solution must apply for ω ∈ [0,0.5), which assigns a lower
weight to the seller in the maximized welfare function (72). ⁄
Finally, Proposition 1 results from combining steps (b) and (c) together with (79). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2




ε +( 1− γ)µ. (93)
Solving this equation for qε, we obtain (21). Using (24), the implied payments are given by (22).
Finally, γ taking values in the interval [0,0.5] spans all values of γ attained in (23) for ω ∈ [0,1].
Thus, Proposition 2 follows. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Given that the equilibrium variables are recursively determined by the set of equations described
in the main text. Existence and uniqueness is implied if equations (33) and (38) have a unique
35admissible solution. The right-hand side of (33) is a continuous and decreasing function of θ,
which image spans the interval (0,2]. The left-hand side of (33) is a continuous and non-decreasing
function of θ, which is bounded away from 0 and 1. Therefore, equation (33) has a unique solution.
The left-hand side of (38) is a decreasing function of n that maps [0,1] onto [0,∞), while the
right-hand side is positive and independent of n. Hence, equation (38) has a unique solution for n
in the interval (0,1). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Equation (47) together with the de￿nitions of θ, mb, and η in (1), (2), and (31), implies (48)
and (51). The labor allocation constraint together with (48) and (51) yields (50). Using (44) to


























Equation (49) results from combining (50) with (94) to (96). Finally, combining (44) and (95), we
obtain (52). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
The equations that determine θ and n in a directed search equilibrium, (33) and (38)-(30), and
the ￿rst best allocation, (48) and (49), can be written as follows:
1
a1 + θ







where a1 = a2 =1in the ￿rst best, and a1 =0 .5,a 2 =( 1+θ)/(0.5+θ) > 1 in equilibrium. The
Implicit Function Theorem applied to (97) and (98) yields dθ/da1 < 0 and dn/da2 > 0. Hence, we
obtain (54) and (53).







36for both the ￿rst best and the equilibrium. Therefore, (55) follows from (99), (53), and η being a
non-increasing function of θ.








Therefore, (56) follows from (55), (53), and ms being increasing.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
(a) When buyer types are public information the directed search equilibrium and the ￿r s tb e s ta l l o -
cations coincide.
As in Section 3, all bilateral trades must be pairwise eﬃcient in equilibrium and the marginal
rates of substitution between θ and ξ of buyers and sellers must coincide. With full information,
the eﬃcient quantities qε are calculated by maximizing the trade surplus, Ub + Us:
































W h e nt h em a r k e tt i g h t n e s si sθ and buyers receive a fraction ξ of the trade surplus, the expected







σ , and (104)







In a directed search equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution between θ and ξ of buyers and
sellers must coincide. Diﬀerentiating (104) and (105), this implies:
ξ = η(θ). (106)
Households allocate b and s so Vb(θ,ξ)=Vs(θ,ξ). Using (104) and (105), this equality yields































which combined with (2) and (102) gives (52). This completes the proof of (a).
(b) If buyer types are private information but sellers charge a lump-sum fee to prospective buyers
prior to the realization of ε, then the directed search equilibrium and the ￿r s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n s
coincide.
Let p be the fee a seller charges to prospective buyers. After the fee p h a sb e e np a i da n dε
is realized, the trading game between a buyer and a seller is identical to the one in Section 3.
Hence, the payment schedule net of the fee p that implements incentive eﬃcient direct revelation
mechanisms has still the functional form (24) and the quantities purchased by the buyer are given



















σ γ(1 − γ)+λp
‚
. (111)
In a directed search equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution of θ for γ,a n do fγ for p must

















σ γ2 − λp
; (112)
γ =1 . (113)









σ [1 − η(θ)]. (114)
Note that this fee implies Vb(θ,γ,p) > 0, so buyers are willing to pay the fee.
Households allocate b and s so Vb(θ,γ,p)=Vs(θ,γ,p). Using (113) and (114), this equality
yields (48). Also, households allocate s and n so Vs(θ,α)=µf0(n). Using (113) and (114), this
38equality yields (107). To show that (49), (50) and (52) hold, we use the exact same steps used in
the proof of (a). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
At y p e - ε buyer chooses













Hence, the return of a seller when matched with a type-ε buyer is









where η = η(θ) and θ is the ￿rst-best level of congestion given by (48). By (48), η ≤ 1.T h u s ,t h e
seller￿s individual rationality constraint is satis￿ed.



















The household chooses its labor allocation so that Vb(θ)=Vs(θ)=µf0(n). The ￿rst equality


































which combined with (2) and (115) gives (52). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
The direct revelation mechanism chosen by the planner must be incentive eﬃcient, so we can
restrict our search to price schedules in (24) for some unknown parameter γ. Substituting (21) into




















(1 − σ)(a + w)
1
1−σ [γ (1 − γ)ms(θ)]
σ
1−σ . (123)
Since (32) holds, the maximization of c implies:
(2γ − 1)ms(θ)+γ(1 − γ)(ms)
0 (θ)
1
2γ2 =0 . (124)
Given (31) and (32), (124) implies (30). ¥
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42Table 1
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Production function: F(k,en)=A1kα (en)
1−α ,α=0 .36
Depreciation rate: 0.1
Rate of interest: r =0 .04
Rate of growth of e: g =0 .018
Discount factor: β =( 1+g)/(1 + r)
One period utility: ln(c)
Preference for diversity: σ =0 .42





Producers (n) 0.500 0.559
Sellers (s) 0.213 0.237
Buyers (b) 0.287 0.203
Capital/Labor Ratio (k/n) 4.374 4.374
Pricing Weight Parameter (γ) 0.270 0
Quantity Purchased When ε ≥ γ (qε)1 1 .23(1.37ε − 0.37)2.38 10.13ε2.38
Welfare Relative to the First Best
(Equivalent Percentage Change in Consumption)
Comparison Across Balanced Paths -0.0794 0
Comparison With Same Initial Capital -0.0787 0
43